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tax notes state
How the Federal Reserve Should Help
States and Localities Right Now
by Darien Shanske and David Gamage

Darien Shanske is a professor at the
University of California, Davis, School of Law
(King Hall), and David Gamage is a professor of
law at Indiana University Maurer School of
Law.
In this installment of Academic Perspectives
on SALT, the authors show how the Federal
Reserve could support state and local
governments during the COVID-19 emergency
to prevent drastic spending cuts.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a giant
catastrophe, but the Federal Reserve can still
mitigate the looming fiscal crises facing state
and local governments. This article — a
contribution to Project SAFE (State Action in
Fiscal Emergencies) — builds on our prior
background essay explaining state and local
1
budget issues.
In the American system of federalism, states
and localities are at the forefront of providing
basic government services, but without the

monetary or financial powers of the central
government. This has worked well enough in
ordinary times, and in most national
emergencies the federal government has taken
the lead. But states and localities are in the lead
in this national emergency, and they need the
federal government’s financial support. The
reason is simple: States are governed by
balanced budget rules, but the federal
2
government is not. There are good reasons for
this difference, but it means that the federal
government must step up in times of crisis.
And the federal government has started to
act. For instance, $150 billion in section 601 of the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act has been allocated to states and
localities for “necessary expenditures” in
connection with COVID-19. And section 4003(b)
of the CARES Act provides up to $434 billion in
loans to states, local governments, and private
businesses. The Fed has used $35 billion of this
$434 billion as an equity contribution to launch a
$500 billion lending program for the states and
3
larger localities. This number is appropriate, as
the National Governors Association has
4
estimated that states will need $500 billion.
Yet those steps are insufficient. Even if $150
billion is the exact amount as to how much states
and localities will pay in necessary COVID-19
expenditures, that will not cover the precipitous
budget shortfalls caused by shutting down large

2

David Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the
Fiscal Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749, 754-68 (2010).
3

U.S. Federal Reserve Board, “Municipal Liquidity Facility” (Apr. 27,
2020).
4

1

Gladriel Shobe et al., “Introducing Project SAFE (State Action in
Fiscal Emergencies),” Tax Notes State, Apr. 27, 2020, p. 471.

National Governors Association, “National Governors Association
Outlines Need for ‘Additional and Immediate’ Fiscal Assistance to
States,” Apr. 11, 2020.
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parts of the economy, which is estimated to
result in a shortfall of $500 billion or even more.5
The Fed has offered to purchase $500 billion in
notes, but they have a three-year limit.6 What
happens then? Also, the current program expires
7
on December 31, 2020. What happens when states
and localities realize that their deficits will
continue to grow?
There are even more problems to consider.
How does the Fed’s short-term lending program
help an airport bond issue that falls behind on its
payments or a mass transit agency wishing to
issue new bonds for a desperately needed project
(that would also create jobs)?
We will address how the Federal Reserve can
assist the municipal bond market in a future essay.
But here, we will focus on the more immediate
need of helping state and local governments avoid
being forced to make drastic spending cuts.
The best answer is for Congress to provide
much greater support for the states and localities
in general. There are many ways this could
happen, including direct grants8 or increased
9
federal support for unemployment insurance.
Unfortunately, Congress seems unlikely to act
either quickly or sufficiently. But that isn’t
necessarily the end of the story. Another actor, the
Federal Reserve, can and should step in to save
the day.

5

Michael Leachman, “New CBO Projections Suggest Even Bigger
State Shortfalls,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Apr. 29, 2020.
(Noting prior estimates “that states would face $500 billion in state
shortfalls in fiscal years 2020 through 2022,” and then revised estimates
of “shortfalls totaling $650 billion, substantially deeper than during the
Great Recession,” and emphasizing that these revised estimates are “for
state budget shortfalls only; it does not reflect the additional shortfalls
that local governments, territories, and tribes face. Federal aid provided
to date will help cover some of these shortfalls but it is not nearly
enough. Only about $65 billion of the aid provided in earlier COVID-19
packages is readily available to narrow these shortfalls. Using that aid
and the $75 billion that states have in rainy day funds would leave states
with about $510 billion in unaddressed shortfalls.”)

I. What the Federal Reserve Can Do
As noted, the Federal Reserve will lend $500
billion to states and localities in the form of shortterm (up to three-year) notes. But the problem
here is that three years is just too short of a time
frame; the states will need to be able to pay back
these loans over a much longer term if they are to
meaningfully help in preventing dramatic,
harmful budget cuts. Therefore, the core of our
proposal is that the loans (or notes purchased) be
extended for a longer term and at a reasonably
low rate — say a 20-year term at the federal
government’s cost of funds, which was 1.02
percent on April 29.10
11
Note that prominent economists such as Ben
12
Bernanke have endorsed using monetary policy
to shore up demand under extreme
circumstances. In the case we are making, the
Federal Reserve would not be creating new
demand in the economy so much as preventing its
needless destruction.
II. Does It Have the Legal Authority to
Make Those Loans?
We should acknowledge that our expertise is
in tax law and public finance, not banking law or
the powers of the Federal Reserve. Nevertheless,
with that caveat, our understanding is that the
Federal Reserve does have the power to make
those loans, but with two complications.
First, to offer the current short-term lending
facility, the Federal Reserve acted under the
authority of section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
13
Act. There is nothing in section 13 that dictates
that the loans must be short term. However,
section 13 was revised by the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to
require more transparency and accountability. Of
particular importance, the Federal Reserve “may
not establish any program or facility under this
paragraph without the prior approval of the

6

The Fed increased the limit from two years to three, which we take
to be a hopeful sign. U.S. Federal Reserve Board, “Federal Reserve Board
Announces an Expansion of the Scope and Duration of the Municipal
Liquidity Facility,” Apr. 27, 2020.
7

Id.

8

Daniel Hemel, Ruth Mason, and Gladriel Shobe, “What the States
Need From Congress Now Is Cold, Hard Cash,” Time, Apr. 14, 2020.
9

Brian Galle et al., “States Should Quickly Reform Unemployment
Insurance,” Tax Notes State, May 4, 2020, p. 635.
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10

U.S. Treasury Department, “Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates.”

11

Adair Turner, “The Case for Monetary Finance — An Essentially
Political Issue,” IMF Jacques Polak Research Conference (Nov. 5, 2015).
12

Ben S. Bernanke, “What Tools Does the Fed Have Left? Part 3:
Helicopter Money,” Brookings Institution, Apr. 16, 2016.
13

Codified at 12 U.S.C. section 343(3); “Municipal Liquidity Facility,”
supra note 3.
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14

Secretary of the Treasury.” Accordingly, the
current short-term program was approved by the
15
secretary of the Treasury.
Thus, for the reasons outlined earlier, the
Treasury secretary may promptly approve a
longer-term lending program. But what if he fails
to do so? Could the Federal Reserve still act on its
own?
We believe the Federal Reserve could use its
powers under section 14 of the Federal Reserve
Act even without the express approval of the
Treasury secretary16 — because the Federal
Reserve’s power under section 14 does not require
approval from the secretary. There is, however, a
significant limitation: Under section 14, the notes
cannot have longer than a six-month maturity.
But how much of a limitation is this really?
Could the Federal Reserve just commit to
permitting states the option to roll over their debts
during the crisis and for a fixed, but significant
period thereafter (again, say 20 years)? Once the
crisis was over, states could only roll over a
decreasing amount of principal each period. The
steadily declining amount of the reduction could
function as a kind of amortization schedule.
The Federal Reserve could even have upfront
rules as to the amount of debt it would be willing
to purchase from a state or locality based on the
size of the projected deficits compared with a
recent historical baseline. That seems a reasonable
safeguard, as a matter of both politics and fiscal
federalism. After all, this program should not be
about bailing out underfunded pension
17
programs.
Federal tax law already has a model for what
18
this calculation might look like. That is because
states and localities regularly borrow for cash
flow purposes, but if they were to borrow too
much, this would turn their borrowing into an
arbitrage bond or would require rebate of the
arbitrage. Accordingly, federal tax law delves into
the definition of a cumulative cash flow deficit.

These rules won’t necessarily translate perfectly to
the context we discuss here, but they should at
least provide a neutral baseline with which to
begin.
III. Can the States Take the Money?
As noted, states face balanced budget
constraints and may not be able to borrow from
the Federal Reserve — at least not without a vote.
In some states, voters can be asked to approve
19
borrowing. But there are also well-worn
exceptions to the debt limitation rules, which
mean that states and localities could borrow from
a Federal Reserve lending program even without
a vote. One notable and widespread exception
from the requirement for an election is for short20
term borrowing, so extending the states’
renewable short-term financing could work well
for both the Federal Reserve and states.
Other exceptions might apply, such as the
21
special fund exception, whereby the state must
commit some special stream of revenue to pay off
a debt rather than general taxes. Perhaps states
and localities could pledge to use some part of
revenue streams that are now very depressed,
such as from hotel taxes, in order to secure needed
loans now. Or, as we plan to elaborate in a future
essay, states may wish to adopt a new, future
revenue source (such as a wealth tax or mark-tomarket reform) to pay off current borrowing.
In sum, the Federal Reserve appears to have
the legal authority needed to act to help states and
localities, and the states and localities appear to
have the authority to accept that help. The
mechanics are somewhat convoluted, and making
it all work will require planning. Thus, as cuts
start being made across the country, the Federal
Reserve must swiftly begin this process.

19

14

12 U.S.C. section 343(3)(B)(iv).

15

U.S. Federal Reserve Board, supra note 6.

16

12 U.S.C. section 355(1).

17

Mary Williams Walsh, “Illinois Seeks a Bailout From Congress for
Pensions and Cities,” The New York Times, Apr. 17, 2020.
18

IRC section 148(f)(4)(B)(iii).

See, e.g., Cal. Const. Art. XVI, section 1. Apologies for the
California-centric examples, but other states are broadly similar. See
Richard Briffault, “Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal
Limits and State Constitutional Law,” 34 Rutgers L.J. 907 (2002).
20

See, e.g., Riley v. Johnson, 219 Cal. 513 (1933); Riley v. Johnson (Riley v.
Johnson II), 6 Cal. 2d 529 (1936).
21

See, e.g., California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott, 17 Cal. 3d 575
(1976); California Educational Facilities Authority v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593
(1974).
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IV. Whither Federalism?
Would our proposal be proper on federalism
grounds? Some have expressed concerns that the
federal government should not bail out
“profligate” states.22 However, we don’t think
those concerns are well placed, for at least two
reasons. First, these are meant to be emergency
measures. It is clearly possible to design aid to
state and local governments that helps them
through the current crisis without bailing out past
mistakes.
Second, and more fundamentally, the system
of American federalism is far from operating as it
should. It is entirely consistent with the theory of
federalism that the federal government should
step in and use its superior financial firepower
during national economic downturns. It has
always been a theoretical weakness of our system
of federalism that states, which have balanced
budget constraints, are also tasked with partially
financing enormous procyclical expenses for
Medicaid and unemployment insurance. The
problems with this arrangement were clear
enough during the Great Recession, but they are
even more apparent now.
V. Conclusion
It is not too late for the Federal Reserve to act
to head off debilitating state and local budget
cuts. It acted boldly to rescue systemically
important entities during the Great Recession.
State and local government spending programs
are at least as important during this pandemic,
and the Federal Reserve should step in to save
them.
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Andrew Desiderio, “McConnell Pushes ‘Bankruptcy Route’ as
Local Governments Struggle,” Politico, Apr. 22, 2020.
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